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“Globalization” is one of the leading causes of public concern in almost every advanced 
industrial country.  Despite this widespread anxiety, those fearful about the eventual 
consequences of globalization have so far received little in the way of guidance from 
experts.  Without systematic research and thorough analysis, commonly posed questions 
about globalization’s impact on the strategies of individual firms, local job markets or the 
future stability of the world economy will remain unanswered. 
 
Co-sponsored by the Keizai Koho Center (Japan Institute for Social and Economic 
Affairs) and the MIT-Japan Program, the Symposium on Globalization and the Future of 
the National Economy gathered experts from Japan and the United States to discuss the 
recently published results of a five-year study by the MIT Industrial Performance Center.  
The study, conducted by thirteen researchers under the leadership of MIT Professor 
Suzanne Berger, followed over 500 international companies between 1999 and 2004 in 
an attempt to discover which corporate practices are succeeding and which are failing in 
today’s globalizing economy.  The study’s findings, published in the volume How We 
Compete: What Companies Around the World Are Doing to Make it in Today's Global 
Economy, represent the first major attempt to provide much needed data and analysis on 
what globalization means for individual firms and, by extension, national economies.1  
The goal of the project was to assess the impact of globalization on technological 
innovation, economic growth, social wellbeing and political stability around the world. 
 
Following an introduction by Mr. Yoshio Nakamura, acting director general of Nippon 
Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) and senior managing director of the Keizai Koho 
Center, and opening remarks by MIT Professor and Director of the Center for 
International Studies Richard Samuels, Berger gave the keynote address outlining the 
main conclusions of the globalization study.  The address was followed by short 
presentations from four panelists.  Dr. Teruaki Aoki, advisor to the Sony Corporation, 
president of Sony University and managing director of the Sony Foundation for 
Education, outlined Sony’s operations in China in the context of its global production 
strategy.  Dr. Robert Madsen, senior fellow at the MIT Center for International Studies 
and author of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Japan Country Report, critiqued the MIT 
study and offered his thoughts on changes in the global finance system.  Mr. Haruo 
Kawahara, president and chief executive officer of the Kenwood Corporation, offered 
lessons from his experiences reforming companies in mature product markets under 
global pressures.  Professor Hugh Whittaker of Doshisha University presented the results 
of his study on Hitachi’s recent reform efforts, with particular focus on the electronic 
giant’s technology management strategy.  The panelists then fielded questions from the 
audience. 
 
                                                 
1 Suzanne Berger, How We Compete: What Companies Around the World Are Doing to Make It in Today’s 
Global Economy (New York: Currency Doubleday, 2005).  The book will appear in Japanese from 
Soshisha Publishers in summer 2006. 
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Taken together, the presentations addressed a wide variety of pressing questions 
regarding the causes, consequences, challenges, and future trajectory of globalization.  
Key questions addressed by the symposium’s participants included: 
 
• How should “globalization” be defined to facilitate meaningful debate? 
 
• What changes have occurred in the global economy over the last twenty years? 
 
• What factors have driven or enabled these changes? 
 
• What theories best account for the changes observed in the behavior of firms? 
 
• How should firms organize their production systems? 
 
• Where should firms locate their production activities? 
 
• What can national governments do to ensure their economies reap the benefits of 
globalization? 
 
• What lessons can be drawn from the past about how best to maintain openness in 
the global economy today? 
 
This report summarizes the major contributions of the symposium in five parts.  The first 
section defines what is meant by “globalization” and presents the consensus view of its 
general causes and consequences.  The next three sections recount the debate among the 
panelists over what these developments mean for three types of actors:  individual firms, 
national governments, and international institutions.  The final section briefly summarizes 
the major conclusions of the symposium. 
 
 
II. Understanding Globalization 
 
In his introductory remarks, Samuels noted that the term “globalization” means many 
things to many people.  The “exquisite imprecision” with which the term has been 
bandied about has sown confusion and hampered attempts to understand both what is 
going on and what is at stake.  To avoid this confusion, Berger and her MIT colleagues 
offer a precise definition:  Globalization refers to “the changes in the international 
economy and in domestic economies that are moving toward creating one world 
market.”2  Put another way, globalization is the process by which the prices of the factors 
of production (labor, capital, goods, and services) become equalized throughout the 
world.  Although Berger is careful to note that the end state of globalization so 
understood—a single world market in which the costs of production are the same the 
word over—is unlikely ever to be realized, defining globalization as a tendency toward a 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p.9. 
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specific economic outcome allows one to focus the discussion of the causes and 
consequences involved. 
 
Understood this way, certain aspects of the globalization debate become less contentious.  
In particular, the panelists showed little disagreement on two key questions: what has 
changed in the global economy over the last two decades and what is behind these 
changes.  With regard to what has changed, there was general agreement with Berger’s 
emphasis on the fragmentation of production systems as the major development of the 
last twenty years.  At the end of the 1980s, the key strength of successful companies 
seemed to be their ability to integrate the full range of production functions within their 
own four walls.  The models of success were large Japanese firms, whose Just in Time 
(JIT) manufacturing system demanded high levels of integration between all stages in the 
production process.  This meant keeping many production capabilities in-house while 
maintaining geographical proximity to key suppliers.  However, the picture in the early 
years of the twenty-first century is quite different.  There has been a major fragmentation 
of the production system, both organizationally, in the sense of which production 
functions are performed in-house, and geographically, in the sense of where production 
activities are located.  To understand how this works, one must first view the production 
process as a set of discrete functions, as in Figure 1 below: 
 












Source: Berger, 2005, p.63. 
 
As production becomes more fragmented, it becomes possible to farm more of the above 
functions out to different suppliers or service providers.  The possibility of divvying up 
production functions in this way has forced firms to consider what Berger and her team 
have labeled “reorganization” or “outsourcing”: “the strategy for selecting which of the 
steps, from defining a product and delivering it to a customer, should remain in-house 
versus the functions that will be outsourced—that is, purchased from other firms.”3 
 
Berger also noted two other related changes to the global economy over the last twenty 
years.  The first involves the redistribution of firms’ production functions between 
“home” and “host” societies.  In short, the ability to fragment the production process has 
induced many companies to reconsider where they locate their activities so as to 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p.59. 
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maximize their access to the cheap labor, plentiful space and new customers available in 
foreign countries.  This development is referred to as “relocation” or “offshoring” by 
Berger’s team.  A final important change has been the re-division of functions among 
players in the production stream, with new patterns of interaction developing between 
brand makers, design firms, contract manufacturers, assemblers, distributors, and 
retailers.  The end result of these changes has been the breakup of production systems 
into networked global supply chains that distribute production functions across firms and 
regions.  These changes run counter to the lessons of the late 1980s, when firms were 
advised to be more like Japanese companies that integrated production functions to 
capitalize on the cost-savings of lean manufacturing techniques.  How quickly the world 
has changed. 
 
But what has driven these changes?  Here again, there was little debate among the 
panelists.  Berger’s keynote address touched on two types of contributing factors, drivers 
and enablers.  Drivers include China’s opening to the West after 1979 and the collapse of 
the Eastern Bloc after 1989, which opened enormous product and factor markets to 
Western firms seeking cheap labor and new consumers, as well as the decision by the 
United States and other advanced industrial countries to liberalize capital markets and 
further remove obstacles to trade, which through the “Uruguay Round” (1986-1994) and 
the establishment of the World Trade Organization greatly expanded the possibilities for 
cross-border capital and trade flows.  A third driver was the accompanying increase in 
world market volatility exemplified by the major financial crises of the last fifteen years 
(e.g. Western Europe (1992), Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Argentina 
(2002)).  This fragility in the global monetary system has increased investment risks and 
thus the cost of capital.  This has discouraged firms from traditional long-term investment 
in brick-and-mortar facilities and encouraged outsourcing to contract manufacturers, 
thereby reducing risks and capital costs.4 
 
While the above factors have encouraged firms to fragment their production systems, an 
additional set of factors have made this fragmentation possible.  These “enablers” include 
advances in communication and transportation technologies that have greatly reduced the 
costs of transmitting information and moving goods and even services across great 
distances.  More specifically, Berger emphasized the importance of the development of 
digitized communication technologies that allow firms to codify product design 
specifications to a degree never before possible.  While in the past the production of a 
new semiconductor required the designer to stand beside the technician carving the mask, 
today complex integrated circuit designs can be specified in exacting detail in digital 
software and sent across the ocean on a fiber-optic cable in a matter of seconds.  It is this 
capability to codify and transmit complex specifications that has made it possible for 
firms to break up their production processes and distribute them with relative ease to 
multiple suppliers or contract manufacturers located throughout the world. 
 
A central metaphor Berger used to explain this transformation in production systems was 
the difference between a model airplane kit and a Lego set.  In the case of the model 
airplane kit, the prepared pieces can only be assembled in one way to produce one final 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p.15. 
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product.  However, with a Lego set, a child could assemble the pieces in a number of 
ways to produce a number of different toys, even different types of planes.  Berger 
offered Apple’s highly successful IPod digital music player as an exemplar of this new 
Lego world.  Although designed by Apple engineers in the United States, the IPod is 
assembled by Taiwanese companies in China out of components that come almost 
entirely from Japan.  It then makes it into the hands of American consumers through 
retailers such as BestBuy or Circuit City.  In essence, Apple has outsourced and/or 
offshored nearly all the steps in the production process with the exceptions of product 
development and design. 
 
While there was little debate over the causes of recent changes in the global economy, the 
panelists were more divided over what these changes mean for individual firms, national 
governments and international institutions.  The next three sections recount this debate 
over globalization’s impact at different levels of analysis and summarizes what lessons 
can be drawn for each. 
 
 
III. Lessons for the Firm 
 
The central focus of the MIT globalization project was to answer two basic questions 
about firm behavior in the current climate of fragmented production systems.  First, what 
functions should firms keep within their own four walls and what should they outsource?  
Second, what functions should firms keep in their home countries and what should they 
offshore?  At the beginning of the project, team members held different expectations over 
how these questions would be answered.  Some believed that companies would tend 
toward adopting a single set of “best practices” that would eventually result in firms 
within the same industries adopting the same outsourcing and offshoring strategies.  This 
view originates largely from mainstream economic theories that predict comparative 
advantage in the context of liberal trade and finance regimes will lead to an equalization 
of factor prices across the globe.5  Applying this view to today’s global economy, they 
believed that firms in the same industries would adopt similar outsourcing/offshoring 
strategies. 
 
A second view held that globalization impacts different societies in different ways.  In 
particular, scholars such as Peter Hall and David Soskice have specified two types of 
capitalist societies: liberal market economies, such as the United States and Britain, in 
which markets serve as the primary medium through which resources are allocated, and 
coordinated market economies, such as Germany and Japan, in which resource allocation 
decisions, such as whether to layoff employees or deal with a particular supplier, are 
mediated through a variety of non-market institutions that emphasizes long-term 
relationships and trust between the parties.  Applying this view, firms located in these 
different “varieties of capitalism” should respond to globalization in different ways while 
those located in the same type of capitalist society should respond in similar ways.  Thus, 
this view would predict that firms from a liberal market economy, more accustomed to 
buying resources from the market, might be more ready to offshore production functions 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p.36. 
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than firms from coordinated market economies that depend on long-term relations with 
their workers.  The “varieties of capitalism” view also predicts that when firms from 
coordinated market economies do move abroad, they will try to recreate the institutions 
on which they depend at home.  For example, a Japanese firm establishing a 
manufacturing subsidiary in China would be more likely than an American firm to 
appoint a manager from within its own ranks rather than hire one from the local labor 
market.  In this way, firms would not converge in their strategies regarding outsourcing 
and offshoring but should show bifurcation in their approaches that coincides with the 
type of capitalism practiced in their home country. 
 
The MIT globalization study examined these two hypotheses by conducting on-site 
interviews at over 500 firms based in Europe, North America and Asia.  The project 
focused on firms in sectors located on two ends of a continuum: fast-tech and slow-tech.  
In fast-tech sectors, such as electronics and software, product and process technologies 
change rapidly and discontinuously.  In slow-tech sectors, such as textiles and apparel, 
these underlying technologies change relatively little over time.  The study also looked at 
some sectors in between these extremes, such as automobiles, auto parts and publishing. 
 
Firms were selected in this way for the following reasons.  First, many people believe 
that slow-tech firms, which tend toward labor-intensive operations, are condemned to 
disappear in high-wage countries.  This sector thus represents a critical case in the sense 
that if some of its firms continue to thrive in advanced industrial countries, it would call 
into question the convergence view that corporate trajectories are largely determined by 
comparative advantages in labor costs.  Second, the study focused on industries (both 
fast-tech and slow-tech) that face intense competitive pressures and are able to outsource 
or offshore parts of their operations with relative ease.  These firms are most likely to be 
on the frontlines of globalization and thus are most instructive as subjects of study. 
 
The MIT team was surprised to find that neither the convergence nor the “varieties of 
capitalism” view was strongly supported in the responses received from firms.  In fact, 
successful firms had followed a variety of different strategies with regard to outsourcing 
and offshoring.  More surprisingly, Berger and her team found that these successful 
strategies did not correlate across specific industries, as the convergence theory predicts, 
or within capitalism types, as the varieties of capitalism view would have it.  Instead, they 
found that how individual firms managed their “dynamic legacies”—understood here as 
the stock of experiences, skills, talents, organizational capabilities, and institutional 
memories—determined their success or failure in the face of global pressures.  In other 
words, the firms that were able to recombine the elements of their legacies in new ways 
in response to the opportunities afforded by globalization succeeded while those that 
were unable to take advantage of these resources did not.  The end result is that firms 
with different legacies found different ways to succeed in the global market even if they 
occupied places in the same industry or were founded in the same country. 
 
A firm’s legacies are generated from the circumstances of its birth, its institutional 
connections to its society of origin, and the numerous decisions of its executives over the 
years.  Noting that these legacies are the product of learning over time, Berger cited the 
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example of Hong Kong garment manufacturers, whose early contacts with buyers in 
either the United States or Europe tended to determine whether they specialized in large-
run, low-price apparel or small-run, high-price clothing.  Although these firms started out 
with similar backgrounds (Shanghai businesses that fled to Hong Kong following the 
Communists takeover in 1949), their experiences with customers led them to develop 
very different production and design capabilities.  These experiences made them into 
very different companies by the late 1970s, when they were confronted with a new 
opportunity, the opening of China.  These firms then again made different decisions 
about whether to move operations to the mainland, decisions that were variously affected 
by their past histories with the China market and their established capabilities.  For 
example, firms that had developed design capabilities and specialized in high-quality 
garments were better able to continue to compete successfully in the relatively high-wage 
Hong Kong market and were thus better positioned to remain as local producers. 
 
Based on these findings, Berger and her team arrived at several lesson for firms 
competing in today’s global markets.  First, they noted that convergence does not appear 
to be occurring with regard to the outsourcing and offshoring strategies of successful 
firms.  Instead, completely different models of success appear within even the same 
product fields.  For example, Apple outsources all of its laptop production to Taiwanese 
original design manufacturers, while Sony continues to make half of its successful Vaio 
laptop line in its own factories in Japan.  Such contrasts were also observed in slow-tech 
sectors.  Although Gap and other US clothing companies outsource and offshore all of 
their production, the fastest growing clothing manufacturer in both the United States and 
Europe today is the Spanish company Zara, which produces half of its products in the 
high-wage environment of northern Spain.  It seems, as Samuels observed, that managers 
are by no means as constrained as is commonly thought.  Individuals and organizations 
have been able to find different workable solutions to the same problems. 
 
Facing a world of possibilities instead of a world of constraints makes deriving lessons 
for firms a more complex endeavor, but Berger and her MIT colleagues offered several 
points of advice.  On the question of what firms should outsource, the MIT team 
recommended that firms follow a hedging strategy in which they maintain only two types 
of functions in-house:  activities in which they are competitive with market leaders and 
activities that may be important to the development of future businesses.  While the 
former is somewhat obvious, the latter may prove a harsh lesson for many firms.  For 
example, Berger noted that firms that have outsourced all manufacturing functions may 
find it difficult to adapt to future changes in product or process technologies.  Kawahara 
reinforced this point with his warnings on the pitfalls of “going fabless.”  In his view, 
outsourcing all manufacturing operations eventually leads to a reduction in 
competitiveness due to the inability of in-house designers to follow-up on developments 
on the factory floor, an increased rigidity in production costs, and the dangerous loss of 
managerial expertise in production processes.  In short, “fabless” firms no longer have 
the ability to adapt efficiently to major changes in production costs and technologies.  
The degree to which this represents a threat to firm survival, however, may vary across 
industry and time.  Among the companies examined in the MIT study, Berger suspected 
that American firms may have been excessive in their enthusiasm for outsourcing 
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manufacturing functions, while Japanese firms may have been too rigid in adhering to 
strategies that have kept most such functions in-house. 
 
A second lesson emphasized by the panelists is that firms need to be careful not to build a 
new competitor as a consequence of their outsourcing strategy.  When firms outsource 
functions, they often share skills and technologies with their providers, who may go on to 
use them to develop their own product lines.  Berger and Samuels both noted that this 
was a lesson learned by Japanese firms in the 1990s.  Strapped for capital in the midst of 
a domestic banking crisis, Japan’s leading electronics manufacturers partnered with 
Korean and Taiwanese collaborators to share costs, but, in the process, transferred key 
technologies in fields such as LCD production only to find themselves facing stiff 
competition from these same “partners” shortly thereafter.  As a consequence, according 
to Samuels, Japanese CEOs now routinely speak of “black-boxing” their technologies 
before entering into outsourcing or offshoring arrangements.  Aoki reinforced this view 
when he cited the danger of intellectual property rights infringement as one of the chief 
risks involved in Sony’s investments in the China market. 
 
On the other hand, some firms are moving in the opposite direction.  IBM, for instance, 
announced in 2005 that it would make several hundred of its patents available for use 
without charge.  Seeking to generate network effects and to take advantage of the 
synergies produced by open standards, these firms are becoming more open with their 
proprietary know-how.  Berger observed that this is not an unreasonable strategy for a 
world of fragmented production systems and global supply chains.  However, while she 
argued that Japanese companies have perhaps become too cautious with their 
technologies, she fears that American companies, in their enthusiasm for outsourcing, are 
letting too many of their technological assets slip into the hands of potential competitors.  
Whittaker, in his presentation on Hitachi, noted that the Japanese electronics giant has 
recently resolved to move toward a more open stance vis-à-vis its technological 
capabilities, although its research and development still remains a relatively closed 
process. 
 
What should firms keep in their home countries and what should they offshore?  Berger’s 
response to this question generated significant debate among the panelists.  Citing 
another conclusion from the MIT project, she argued there are no “sunset industries”—
industries that are condemned to disappear in high-wage economies due to the forces of 
globalization.  In the dynamic legacies model, it is a firm’s capabilities, not its industry or 
sector that matter.  Thus, although some strategies may be rendered unviable by shifts in 
the global economy, firms with the right capabilities should be able to persevere even in 
mature product markets in advanced industrial countries.  Berger cited as an example the 
Italian shoe manufacturer Geox.  Founded in 1995, Geox has rapidly become the world’s 
fourth-largest shoe brand on the strength of new technologies and innovative designs. 
Although the firm now manufactures its shoes in low-wage countries, it continues to 
locate research, design and management functions in Montebelluna, Italy, in order to take 
advantage of the region’s skilled and experienced labor force.  Geox’s success is thus 
startling evidence that a company based in a high-cost country can leverage its legacies to 
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remain competitive even in a mature industry dominated by low-cost producers from 
countries like China and Vietnam. 
 
Citing the example of the 19th-century British textile industry, Madsen challenged the 
conclusion that there are no sunset industries and argued there was a bias in the way the 
MIT research was conducted.  To him, a “sunset industry” is one that declines in a 
particular country until only a few firms remain.  These surviving firms will often see 
themselves as successful and respond positively when questioned about the health of their 
business.  Since the MIT researchers examined only existing firms, they failed to get the 
perspective of firms that had already failed as a consequence of global pressures, 
particularly due to differences in labor costs across countries.  In this sense, according to 
Madsen, the design of the MIT project limited its ability to capture secular trends in the 
rise and decline of industries.  Whittaker responded to this critique by citing the example 
of the textile firms in Japan, where high wages have not driven the industry out of 
existence.  Although these firms have hemorrhaged jobs over the last decade, many have 
survived and some have even engineered comebacks by following innovative strategies, 
such as outsourcing spinning or targeting global niche markets.  He concluded that there 
are ways for today’s managers to adapt to global pressures and that the Japanese textile 
industry need not disappear like its British counterpart.  In the end, the differences 
between Berger and Whittaker, on the one hand, and Madsen, on the other, may lie in 
their choices of different levels of analysis.  While the former focus on management 
decisions from a micro perspective, the latter’s approach is centered on outcomes at the 
macro-level. 
 
Berger offered another surprising lesson for firms:  the pursuit of cheap labor has not 
proven a winning strategy in the current age of globalization.  Although managers 
repeatedly listed labor cost savings as their primary goal in offshoring production, they 
usually also admitted that labor costs were only a minor part of the total cost of 
production.  Berger argued that the limited savings achieved through offshoring did not 
always appear to justify the costs and risks involved.  Although companies are often 
attracted by the low wages of developing countries, in the end, what matters are unit 
labor costs—the labor needed to produce a given value of production—and these are 
often higher than one might expect.  Factors common in low-wage countries, such as 
political instability, inexperienced workers, poor infrastructure, and excessive fluidity in 
local labor markets, often increase unit labor costs and reduce the ultimate benefit of 
offshoring. 
 
This view was shared by many of the panelists.  Kawahara noted that producing in Japan 
can sometimes be more cost effective than offshoring to low-wage Asian countries.  For 
example, Kenwood relocated production of its portable mini-disc (MD) player from 
Malaysia back to its factory in Yamagata, Japan, because better worker productivity, 
improved quality, and faster speed-to-market offset the higher wage bill.  Aoki 
emphasized the risks of relying too heavily on production in China, including the dangers 
inherent in China’s immature constitutional government, the specter of rapid labor cost 
increases in urban areas, the danger of intellectual property rights infringement, the 
difficulties caused by the Chinese government’s efforts to institute its own technological 
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standards (often to the disadvantage of foreign competitors), and the possibility of a 
future yuan revaluation, among others.  Although Sony has expanded production in China 
significantly in recent years, it currently represents only about a tenth of the firm’s total 
production.  In fact, despite the allure of lower wages in nearby Asian countries, Sony 
plans to keep half its production in Japan in order to promote innovation in production 
processes and to maintain “mother plants” to control production in overseas facilities.  In 
addition, Aoki noted that Sony does not see China simply as a low-wage export platform: 
the firm’s presence there is also focused on expanding access to the growing Chinese 
consumer electronics market. 
 
In his introductory remarks, Samuels placed the experiences of Kenwood and Sony in 
context.  According to government statistics, the “hollowing out” trend in Japan’s 
manufacturing sector has recently reversed:  domestic capital investment increased by 
more than 40% between 2003 and 2004.  Matsushita, Toray, and Sharp have all 
announced new production lines in Japan, while Canon has joined Sony in pledging to 
keep half of its production in domestic facilities.  The accounts of Kawahara and Aoki are 
thus in step with larger trends in the Japanese electronics sector. 
 
Although none of the speakers denied the potential advantages of offshoring production, 
they cautioned against strategies that relied solely on the pursuit of cheap labor.  As 
Berger observed, following such a strategy condemns a firm to a “bottom-feeder” 
existence in which facilities are constantly relocated in pursuit of the lowest wages and 
razor-thin profit margins.  Instead, Berger and her MIT colleagues concluded that the 
only winning strategies in today’s global economy are ones that differentiate a company 
by developing unique capabilities. 
 
The discussion of firm-level outcomes continually returned to China.  Berger was 
particularly struck by differences her team discovered between the strategies pursued by 
Japanese and American firms in the China market.  While American firms most often 
outsource production to Taiwanese firms operating on the mainland, Japanese firms are 
more likely to establish their own production facilities in China.  As a result, Japanese 
manufacturers have learned more about how to be successful in the China market, a fact 
that Berger believes may be helped Japan avoid huge trade deficits like the one the 
United States currently has with China (about $162 billion in 2004).   
 
Although German companies have also established many of their own facilities in China, 
a fact that would seem to support the varieties of capitalism argument, Berger noted a key 
difference between the Japanese and German approaches to the China market.  Japanese 
firms such as Matsushita have begun targeting all segments of China’s consumer market, 
from high-end products such as digital cameras to low-end products such as conventional 
refrigerators, while German and American firms have continued to focus mainly on high-
end product markets.  According to Berger, the Japanese seem intent on using what 
they’ve learned from their local operations to compete with low-cost Chinese producers 




IV. Lessons for National Governments 
 
Although the symposium focused largely on firm-level outcomes, the panelist also 
offered opinions on how national governments should respond to recent changes in the 
global economy.  One area of agreement among the panelists was the need for national 
governments to implement policies designed to sustain public support for maintaining 
openness in the international economy.  Both Madsen and Berger emphasized how the 
perceived costs of globalization can turn local regions and even entire countries against 
openness.  To make this point, Madsen noted that today only three developing countries 
(Turkey, South Africa, and India) run significant current account deficits.  Despite the 
fact that this reluctance to import capital likely shaves one or two points off their annual 
gross domestic products, developing countries have largely stopped borrowing money 
from the developed world.  Madsen sees this as a response to the currency crises of the 
1990s, when developing countries such as Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Russia and 
Argentina were devastated by currency shifts caused by the rapid withdrawal of foreign 
capital.  The economic hardships and political upheavals that ensued have discouraged 
Third World countries from relying again on foreign borrowing to finance domestic 
growth.  Although Madsen was not certain which policies could remedy this situation, he 
pointed to efforts to encourage China to fix its domestic financial system and stop 
exporting so much capital as a good place to start. 
 
The loss of enthusiasm for openness, however, is not confined to the Third World.  
Berger pointed out that a majority of Americans think globalization is bad for the job 
market.  And they may have a point—a recent study concludes that, while most who lost 
their jobs over the last three years have found new ones, two-thirds of these jobs pay less 
than the jobs that were lost.6  Although Berger believes the number of jobs lost to 
globalization is likely exaggerated in the media, she stressed the need for national 
governments in North America and Europe to implement policies designed to maintain 
the consensus in support of openness.  But how can this be done? 
 
Maintaining openness will likely require reforms in social welfare, technology and 
education polices.  First and foremost, Berger stressed the importance of national 
governments finding ways to compensate citizens who are adversely affected by 
globalization.  In part, this means guaranteeing access to healthcare and old-age pensions.  
Although some may question this approach as economically inefficient, Berger noted the 
vitality of the Swedish economy over recent years.  Despite having a large welfare state, 
Sweden has experienced solid economic growth.  Second, as private firms in developed 
countries like the United States have moved away from funding corporate labs to do basic 
research, government support for research and development in university and public 
laboratories has become much more important.  Pointing to the large number of 
biotechnology firms clustered in the corridor between MIT and Harvard, Berger posited 
that one way to make industries and jobs sticky is to continue to invest in innovation.  If 
biotechnology does become the next great growth industry, many of the key innovations 
will likely begin as research projects in university laboratories supported by public 
money.   
                                                 
6 Ibid., pp.21-22. 
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Berger and Madsen both stressed the need for education reforms.  To Berger, the 
continuing inability of the United States to provide a large portion of its citizens with any 
education at the post-secondary school level creates a vast potential reservoir of anti-
globalization.  When large numbers of American are simply not given the tools necessary 
to succeed in a global economy, it seems inevitable that the country’s commitment to 
open competition in the international economy will eventually wane.  Taking a different 
tack, Madsen criticized the tightening of immigration policies that has made it more 
difficult for foreign students to study in American universities since the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001.  Madsen argued that keeping universities open to international 
students, who after graduation will often work for a time in the United States before 
returning to their home country, is essential to maintaining the United Sates at the center 
of world business culture.  One should not underestimate the advantages for US firms of 
the current global trade and finance regimes, which often equate world business norms 
with those that prevail in the United States.   
 
 
V. Lessons for International Institutions 
 
A final area in which the panelists pointed out problems and considered solutions 
involved the international institutions that govern the flow of trade, services, capital and 
people between countries.  This discussion was largely framed through a comparison 
between the current round of globalization and the one that occurred between 1870 and 
1914.  Berger pointed out that during this “first globalization” capital mobility, trade and 
immigration among countries were by some measures even higher than they are today.  
What can be learned from this first globalization?  Berger offered a sobering observation.  
Despite being driven by irreversible technological advances (e.g. the advent of 
steamships, international telegraph and telephone services, etc.), the first round of 
globalization came to an end in a single day.  The walls around countries went up after 
the outbreak of World War I in August 1914 and did not come down again for seventy 
years.  In fact, it was not until the 1980s that the world returned to the levels of cross-
border exchanges reached during the first globalization.  The lesson here is that 
globalization is not irreversible.   
 
It is thus important to be aware that easily imaginable events, such as dramatic acts of 
international terrorism or the outbreak of epidemics such as the avian flu, could cause 
serious problems for the current round of globalization.  Even events such as the recent 
surge in anti-Japan protests in China may serve to give pause to Japanese firms 
considering where to locate their production operations.  As Berger concluded, the 
political will to maintain openness in cross-border exchange remains a necessary 
condition for the continuation of the current round of globalization.  It thus falls on 
national governments and the international institutions they create to continue to 
overcome the challenges to globalization that will inevitably arise. 
 
Madsen also expressed concern for the future of openness in the international economy.  
Although levels of trade today are somewhat higher than a hundred years ago, the speed 
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and volume of today’s cross-border financial flows vastly outstrip those achieved during 
the first globalization.  As a consequence, shocks are much more pronounced today.  For 
example, when capital flows reversed direction in Asia in 1997, countries like Indonesia 
and South Korea lost both good and bad companies and suffered great dislocations within 
their societies.  Easing the negative impacts caused by this volatility should thus be on the 
top of the agenda for those committed to maintaining the current round of globalization.  
However, in Madsen’s opinion, the international institutions of today are actually less 
effective at managing the dangers inherent in these enormous capital flows than those 
that existed during the first era of globalization.  In what was perhaps the most 
controversial observation of the symposium, Madsen pointed to the empires of countries 
such as Britain and France as key factors that sustained openness in the face of volatility 
during the 19th century.  These vast empires were more willing than countries of today to 
let international markets work, as, by virtue of their vast holdings, losses in one region 
would likely be offset by gains in another.  Madsen argued that today’s national 
governments and international institutions are less committed to openness and less 
willing to shoulder temporary losses in favor of future gains. 
 
By way of example, Madsen noted how the world responded to the accumulation of 
excess savings in Japan during the postwar period.  This phenomenon occurred often 
during the 19th century, when imperial trading blocks countenanced such imbalances for 
long periods of time.  Rather than letting markets do their work, however, national 
governments placed great pressure on Japan over the last twenty years to export more 
capital and correct the imbalance in its capital account.  Madsen thus concluded that key 
actors in today’s international economy are less willing to allow markets to function as 
economic textbooks prescribe.  In his view, the global system is less flexible than it used 
to be, governments are intervening too often, and the international institutions set up to 





Despites some areas of disagreement, the symposium participants came to similar 
conclusions on many of the questions surrounding globalization.  First and foremost, 
everyone viewed globalization in economic terms while at the same time acknowledging 
its important political underpinnings.  Berger’s definition of globalization as the process 
of moving toward a single world market for the factors of production thus provided a 
useful frame for panelists addressing different parts of the globalization puzzle.  Second, 
there was little disagreement over what has changed at the firm level since the 1980s.  All 
the panelists devoted at least part of their presentations to addressing issue related to the 
fragmentation of production systems.  Finally, there was also little disagreement over the 
factors that have brought about this change.  These include efforts on the part of 
advanced industrial countries to promote further liberalization, the opening of China and 
the former Eastern Bloc countries to the global economy, increased volatility in global 
financial markets, as well as the development of digital communication technologies that 
allow the codification and rapid transmission of complex production techniques. 
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The panelists were somewhat less unified on what these changes mean for individual 
firms.  Although they agreed that firms should be careful in their outsourcing strategies 
so as not to build a competitor or surrender functions that might produce future 
businesses, they disagreed over whether the fragmentation of production obviated the 
possibility of “sunset” industries.  In particular, Berger and Whittaker argued that this 
change has now made it possible for any industry to survive, as long as its firms choose 
to compete on the functions in which they retain advantages as a consequence of their 
dynamic legacies.  Madsen, on the other hand, argued that the forces of globalization are 
such that industries dependent on labor intensive operations are still likely to disappear in 
high-wage countries.  However, the majority of the panelists did agree that the pursuit of 
cheap labor has not proven a winning strategy in today’s global economy.  Berger, Aoki, 
and Kawahara all cautioned firms to be aware of the full risks involved before deciding to 
offshore significant amounts of their production to low-wage countries. 
 
The consensus returned, however, when the discussion turned to what national 
governments should do to maximize the benefits of globalization for their citizens.  Here, 
Madsen joined Berger in encouraging governments to work to sustain support for 
openness in their societies.  To do this, national governments will have to compensate 
losers by increasing access to healthcare, pensions and education.  Noting that 
technological innovation is one way to make industries remain at home, Berger also 
stressed the need for governments to support basic research conducted in university and 
public laboratories. 
 
Finally, several of the panelists drew lessons from comparisons with an earlier period of 
openness in the global economy from 1870 to 1914.  Berger noted that this first 
globalization was driven by similar forces yet ended abruptly.  Globalization should thus 
not be viewed as an irreversible process, but as a continuing endeavor that requires 
constant attention from national governments and international institutions.  New 
challenges, such as terrorism or viral outbreaks, will inevitably arise and test the political 
will that underpins today’s globalization.  In addition, the panelists agreed that 
international markets are more volatile today than in the past.  In particular, the volume 
and rapidity of today’s capital flows represent unprecedented challenges to the global 
economy.  Although no specific proposals were offered, several of the panelists 
emphasized that if new methods are not found to cushion these shocks, support for 
globalization may continue to fall around the world. 
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